Between Hegel and Spinoza: A Volume of Critical Essays (Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy)

Between Hegel and Spinoza: A Volume of Critical Essays (Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy)

Jason E. Smith

Language: English

Pages: 224

ISBN: 1472568184

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


Recent
work in political philosophy and the history of ideas presents Spinoza and
Hegel as the most powerful living alternatives to mainstream Enlightenment
thought. Yet, for many philosophers and political theorists today, one must
choose between Hegel or Spinoza. As Deleuze's influential interpretation
maintains, Hegel exemplifies and promotes the modern "cults of death," while
Spinoza embodies an irrepressible "appetite for living." Hegel is the figure of
negation, while Spinoza is the thinker of "pure affirmation". Yet, between
Hegel and Spinoza there is not only opposition. This collection of essays seeks
to find the suppressed kinship between Hegel and Spinoza. Both philosophers
offer vigorous and profound alternatives to the methodological individualism of
classical liberalism. Likewise, they sketch portraits of reason that are
context-responsive and emotionally contoured, offering an especially rich appreciation
of our embodied and historical existence. The authors of this collection
carefully lay the groundwork for a complex and delicate alliance between these
two great iconoclasts, both within and against the Enlightenment tradition.

Deconstruction, Its Force, Its Violence: together with "Have We Done with the Empire of Judgment?" (SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy)

Badiou: A Philosophy of the New

The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis

Eight Theories of Ethics

On Aristotle Physics 1.1-3 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle)

Ancient Philosophy: From 600 BCE to 500 CE (The History of Philosophy)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

opinion, a subjective, arbitrary way of thinking of an individual, as an aberration of speculation; on the contrary, speculative thinking in the course of its progress finds itself necessarily occupying that standpoint and to that extent the system is perfectly true; but it is not the highest standpoint. Yet this does not mean that the system can be regarded as false, as requiring and being capable of refutation; on the contrary, the only thing about it to be considered false is its claim to be

Spinoza’s physics the simple seems to relate only with the simple, and the complex with the complex, there appears to be a gap between this man’s simplicity in an initial state of nature and his complexity in a state of society arising from social affects. It is probably because Spinoza acknowledges this methodological tension in his Ethics that he takes over Machiavelli’s influential notion of the multitude in order to overcome it. In the TP, like before, the experience of men conceived in

absolute whose development cannot be understood according to the two poles Hegel explicitly acknowledges: an origin whose development can only appear as loss and degradation, or an absolute which avoids such a fate by deferring itself to an end which was already contained in the beginning. But this danger does not appear as such on the scene: the attribution to Spinoza of a theory of emanation is not merely an error but has a strategic function. It serves to divert our attention from what

the outset we there make assumptions such as . . . point and line; but in Philosophy the content should be known as the absolutely true” (LHP, 263). Hegel grants a certain “correctness” to Spinoza’s “name-definition[s] as a correspondence of name with conception. But is the content true absolutely?” Geometers don’t ask this question but “in philosophical investigation it is the very thing to be first considered, and this Spinoza has not done” (LHP, 264). Accordingly, Spinoza explains or

existing thing, but such knowledge is in principle inaccessible to us. This is not to say that we should give up and regress to the confusion of the passive affects. Indeed, our understanding of the laws of motion and rest are enough to make singular things sufficiently intelligible that we no longer need to rely upon teleology. But “sufficient” intelligibility of something does not mean its “complete” intelligibility and confusing those terms is precisely the confusion of teleology. One knows

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