Republicanism and Political Theory

Republicanism and Political Theory

Language: English

Pages: 290

ISBN: 1405155809

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

Republicanism and Political Theory is the first book to offer a comprehensive and critical survey of republican political theory.

  • Critically assesses its historical credentials, conceptual coherence, and normative proposals
  • Brings together original contributions from leading international scholars in an interactive way
  • Provides the reader with valuable insight into new debates taking place in republican political theory

Inventing the Needy: Gender and the Politics of Welfare in Hungary

The Politics of Sexual Harassment: A Comparative Study of the United States, the European Union, and Germany

Is There Anything Good About Men?: How Cultures Flourish by Exploiting Men

Women, Race, & Class











knowingly subjugated person. Nonetheless, she will be unfree in many respects so long as the dominant person’s ascendance decreases the range of her combinations of conjunctively exercisable liberties. Her unfreedom is independent of her knowledge of her unfreedom. (Of course, nothing said here has been meant to suggest that a dependent person is very likely to remain ignorant of the lowliness and precariousness of her condition. As Pettit has argued, a situation of dominance and subjection will

theorists. Neither do I share Pettit’s view (2000) that pure negative theorists cannot justify limiting their attention to humanly caused obstacles. They limit their attention in this way because they see their conception of freedom as a political conception. In this, pure negative freedom is surely no different from freedom as non-domination or as the absence of dependence (the conceptions favored by republicans). For it is no less plausible to talk, in a non-political context, of our being

Related? of freedom. A moralized definition of freedom states that obstacles do not restrict one’s freedom as long as they are morally legitimate obstacles. For example, libertarians often assume a rights-based moralized definition of freedom when they claim that a minimal state leaves everyone’s freedom perfectly intact. The assumption, here, is that obstacles are sources of unfreedom only if they violate property rights. Critics have rightly pointed out that this definition fails to treat

treasury for personal gain). His general verdict, therefore, was that republics could not survive in the contemporary world. But to this he added an important rider, which was later eagerly seized upon by the authors of The Federalist, anxious to show that republican government could exist securely in a large territory: a federal republic – a confederation of small units each of which took the form of a self-governing republic – could offer a third alternative that avoided both internal

such social legislation rarely argue on selfinterested grounds. Rather, they contend they are upholding the property rights necessary for a dynamic economic system that it is in the public interest to keep. Hence the need to give these rights constitutional protection against myopic majoritarian calls for redistribution. However, proponents of social justice mount a similarly principled case that also appeals to arguments for economic efficiency, and seek likewise to constitutionalize social

Download sample