The New Spymasters: Inside the Modern World of Espionage from the Cold War to Global Terror
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The old world of spying-dead-letter boxes, microfilm cameras, an enemy reporting to the Moscow Center, and a hint of sexual blackmail-is history. The spymaster's technique has changed and the enemy has, too. He or she now frequently comes from a culture far removed from Western understanding and is part of a less well-organized group. The new enemy is constantly evolving and prepared to kill the innocent. In the face of this new threat, the spymasters of the world shunned human intelligence as the primary way to glean clandestine information and replaced it with an obsession that focuses on the technical methods of spying ranging from the use of high-definition satellite photography to the global interception of communications. However, this obsession with technology has failed, most spectacularly, with the devastation of the 9/11 attacks. In this searing modern history of espionage, Stephen Grey takes us from the CIA's Cold War legends, to the agents who betrayed the IRA, through to the spooks inside Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Techniques and technologies have evolved, but the old motivations for betrayal-patriotism, greed, revenge, compromise-endure. Based on years of research and interviews with hundreds of secret sources, Stephen Grey's The New Spymasters is an up-to-date exposé that shows how spycraft's human factor is once again being used to combat the world's deadliest enemies.
structure. 8 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 272. 9 Genrikh Borovik, The Philby Files: The Secret Life of the Master Spy – KGB Archives Revealed (London, Time Warner Paperbacks, 1995), p. xiv. 10 Ibid., p. 212. 11 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 272. 12 Borovik, The Philby Files, Introduction by Phillip Knightley, p. xiv. 13 Ibid., p. 216. 14 Ibid., p. 217. 15 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p. 342. 16 Telegram from Sorge to GRU, as detailed in Robert Whymant, Stalin’s
Albert Lulushi, an Albanian-American author, based on a study of declassified CIA files. Nicholas Pano, a history professor, in a review of Lulushi’s work, concludes that he puts Philby in perspective: It demonstrates that although he was knowledgeable of the plans against Albania, he did not have access to the operational plans in Albania. Although he was a factor in the failure of this adventure in Albania, the main factors were the rivalry and divisions among the Albanian émigré groups, the
that spy was betrayed by our side, your side [the British], or the Germans. That’s pretty much a fact. It’s true for us [US] too. The FBI almost never caught a spy unless someone betrayed them.’ In Moscow, huge resources were devoted to tailing US diplomats, and Soviet citizens had little freedom. Yet, even so, the CIA ran spies under the KGB’s nose, which was a ‘stunning accomplishment’, said Bearden. What gave tension to the spy game was that so much effort and preparation went into vital
They too saved lives. But their success also gradually modified the enemy’s behaviour. Even with superb intelligence penetration at the highest level, the tight cell-based structure the IRA could develop meant that the detail of most attacks was not known in advance. And, as Clarke says, whether it was the money-motivated street source or the sophisticated leader seeking political options, few spies were pure agents delivering a simple one-way flow of intelligence. * * * I was discussing
can fall into disrepute. This is what happened in the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003, which showed the very personal, human way that spying can turn into lying. Chapter 6 Caveat Emptor ‘They tried too hard. They wanted to make a difference, to change policy, change the world. That is always a mistake’ – retired senior officer, SIS An intelligence expert was reading from a book about a secret agent with the code name Curveball. The agent had become famous for telling the world that Iraq’s